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STUDENT NOTES AND BECENT CASES
tral R. Co. v. Jones, 95 Fed. 370; French v. Taunton Branch R. Co.,
116 Mass. 537. These two views show the extreme holdings. One
line of decisions holding it an arbitrary rule of law, and the other
line considering it evidence for the jury. There is an intermediate
class of cases that seemingly meets with popular approval in deter-
mining whether the question is for the court or jury, and that is,
that the surrounding circumstances impose upon the traveller the
duty of stopping, looking and listening. This is the view of the
principal case, and we submit that it is the most reasonable doc-
trine. 3 ELLIOTT, RAILROADS, § 1167; 22 R. C. L. 1030. For exten-
sive citation of authorities, see 1 Am. LAw REP. 203. This holding
seems to be the trend of late decisions in many jurisdictions. If
the negligence of the plaintiff is palpable, showing a disregard of
personal safety, the courts do not hesitate to pronounce such con-
duct contributory negligence as a matter of law. On the other
hand, if the circumstances indicate doubt as to the negligence of
the plaintiff, the question is submitted to the jury. There are a
number of cases from various states decided within the last year
which are clearly in line with reasoning and holding in the prin-
cipal case. Loughman v. Hines, 200 Pac. 1086 (Wash.); Butler v.
Payne, 203 Pac. 869 (Utah); Saddler v. Northern Pacific R. Co.
203 Pac. 10 (Wash.) ; Morrow v. Hines, 233 S. W. 493 (Mo.); Al-
exander v. St. Louis, San Francisco R. Co., 233 S. W. 44 (Mo.);
Holtkamp v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 234 S. W. 1054 (Mo.) ; Reynolds
v.Hines, 185 N. W. 30 (Iowa); Murden v. Virginia R. & Power
Co., 107 S. E. 660 (Va.); Swearingen v. United States Ry. Admin-
istration, 183 N. W. 330 (Iowa). It is submitted that these cases
lay down the more reasonable rule, and that the measure of cau-
tion depends on the circumstances. Ruenzi v. Payne, 231 S. W.
294 (Mo.). -C. P. H.
EVIDENCE-RAPE-COMPLI NT.-In a prosecution for attempt to
commit rape, the husband of the prosecutrix was permitted to
testify, in corroboration of his wife, as to the particulars of the of-
fence as related to him by his wife six hours after it occurred.
Held, it is reversible error to permit a witness to testify to the par-
ticulars. State v. Peck, 110 S. E. 715 (W. Va., 1922.)
Formerly it was laid down that one could corroborate his wit-
ness by evidence showing that he had been consistent with himself,
but, as a general doctrine, that ceased to be the law in England a
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hundred years ago. 15 Am. L. REv. 830. But by the rules of evi-
dence prevailing now, statements made by a witness out of court
are not admissible to corroborate his testimony until it has been
assailed. State v. Rorabacker, 10 Iowa 154; Commonwealth v.
Cleary, 72 Mass. 175. Yet notwithstanding these later developed
principles, there is in the case of rape, a well established exception
whereby the testimony of the prosecutrix can be corroborated by
showing she made a complaint shortly after the alleged offence.
This exception is an historical survival of the ancient practice
requiring the woman to make hue and cry. BRACTON, folio 147a.
Later in the historical development of the law Lord Hale comment-
ed upon the rule by saying, "these and the like are concurring
evidences to give greater probability to her testimony." 1 Hale
P. C., 632, 633. All the courts assert that this evidence is ad-
missible merely to confirm the prosecutrix's testimony, and not
as a substantive testimony to prove the truth of the fact alleged,
Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio St. 393; Stevens v. People, 158 Ill. 111,
41 N. E. 856. It follows, therefore, that the unsound doctrine of
res gestae has no application inasmuch as it applies only to cases.
where the evidence is offered to prove the truth of the fact asserted.
Regina v. Guttridge, 9 C. & P 471; Commonwealth v. Cleary,
supra. While there is a conflict of opinion as to the scope of
the confirmatory evidence that is admissible, the great weight
of authority, both in this country, and in England, would
limit it to the bare complaint, prohibiting the witness from reciting
to the jury the particulars of the alleged offence as narrated by,
the prosecutrix. See, 33 Cyc. 1463 and cases there cited; 3 GREN-
LFF, EviDENCE, 213; 2 BisHoP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 963; 1 Rus-
SEL, CRImEs, 688. The reason for excluding the detail while ad-
mitting the bare fact of the complaint has never been clear, and
consequently the minority, including several English cases and four
American jurisdictions, vigorously maintain that the rule admitting
particulars is sounder on principle and better for ascertainment ok
truth-the ultimate object of the law of evidence. State v. Kinnly,
44 Conn. 155; State v. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465; Territory v. Schilling,.
17 Hawaii 249; Dunn v. State, 45 Ohio St. 252; Philips v. State,.
9 Humph. (Tenn.) 246; Rex v. Wood, 14 Cox C. C. 46.
In England the soundness of the rule excluding particulars was.
seriously questioned by Baron Parke when he said, "For reasons
which I never could understand the usage to exclude particulars.
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has obtained." Regina v. Walker, 2 Mood & Rob. 212. In 1877
Bramwell permitted the full particulars for the purpose of corrob-
oration. Regina v. Wood, supra. In 1896 the Court for Crown
Cases Reserved affirmed this holding. Rex v. Lillyman, 2 Q. B. 167.
It is submitted that in view of the facts that the exception is well
engrafted into the law and that its solely admitted purpose is to
corroborate the truthfulness of the prosecutrix's testimony, the
rule permitting particulars is more conducive to the ascertainment
of truth. "If her story were untrue greater would be the oppor-
tunity for detection, and accused would be helped in his defense.
If her story is true, the evidence would show constancy in the
charge even to details, and the truth would more clearly appear."
Benton v. Starr, 58 Conn. 285, 20 AtI. 450.
-M. H. M.
EVIDENCE--SIMIuAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.-In a proceeding
to condemn a right-of-way for the purpose of erecting a high-ten-
sion electric line, evidence of sales of other land of similar char-
acter, though not in the immediate vicinity, was admitted for the
purpose of aiding the jury in assessing the value of the land taken
and damages to the residue. Held, the evidence was properly ad-
mitted. Virginian Power Co. v. Brotherton, 110 S. E. 546 (W.
Va. 1922.)
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has heretofore
properly held that evidence of the value of town lots is not com-
petent evidence of the value of country land. Buckhannon etc.
R. Co. v. Great Scott Coal & Coke Co., 75 W. Va. 423, 83 S. E.
1031. In that case the court stated that evidence of prices paid
others by the condemnor for land and damages to the residue,
thoughi located in the same vicinity, is not proper evidence to go
to the jury on the question of damages. Ibid., syl. 12. In a sub-
sequent case the price paid by the condemnor for a lot in the imme-
diate vicinity of the condemned lot was held admissible, the court
distinguishing this case from the former case on the ground that
here the entire lot was being taken, so that there was no element
of damages to the residue to be considered. Baltimore etc. R. Co.
v.Bonafield's Heirs, 79 W. Va. 287, 90 S. E. 868. In view of
the fact that the element of damages to the residue was under con-
sideration in the principal case, the latter seems to be a tacit over-
ruling of the twelfth point of the syllabus of Buckhannon etc. R.
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